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Z A I N A L  K L I N G  
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the pattern of the relationship between United 
Malays' National Organisation (UMNO) and its partners in the 
Barisan Nasional (National Front, or BN) and the factors regulating 
their relationship especially in the context of the 2004 general election. 
The pattern of the relationship and the fundamental factors affecting 
them provide insights into the dynamics of power relations between the 
political parties. These patterns and factors affect the general perception 
of actors within the co~nplex grouping, and the manner by which each 
component group and its internal constitution would perceive its own 
role and identity, and, in turn, how they would react towards each other 
and towards the outside world. With each component upholding its 
fundamental objective of existence, which is perpetuating the group 
identity, their i~lteractio~ls will inevitably generate tension, rivalry, and 
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a certain degree of conflict. In the long run, a political culture sustaining 
the group cohesioil will emerge. To maintain and perpetuate the complex 
grouping, each component would always have to make adjustments 
between the idealism of its subjective demands and the reality of group 
cohesion. The interplay of such adjustments is reflected in the complex 
web of intet--group and interpersonal identity maintenance and cohesive 
relationships among members. In the long run, the relationships would 
allow the sedimentation of the pattern within which the identities are 
maintained and interactions carried out. The case of the Malaysian 
elections, specifically the recent 2004 general election, provides us with 
an insight into the perpetuation of the culture of complex identities. 
The March 2004 Malaysian general election is a historic event viewed 
in the light of the leadership of the new Malaysian prime minister, 
~bdullahAhmad Badawi. NO; only is the prime minister-new to his post, 
but to call an early election and emerge victorious can be considered a 
personal triumph. With more than four-fifths of BN candidates returned 
(198 out of 2 19) and an increase in the popular vote of 64 per cent as 
opposed to 55 per cent in 1999, it completely debunked the euphoria of 
anti-UMNOIBN largely displayed by many analysts of the 1999 general 
election.' With some writers already quick in calling the 1999 election as 
( 6  new politics in Malaysia", even governments outside of Malaysia were 
already in dialogue with the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) leadership 
on possible future relationships in the face of BN possible demise as a 
goveri~ment.' The 2004 election has therefore surprised many observers 
and analysts when the rate of swing was almost unthinkable. 
Inevitably, the 2004 results also aroused the suppressed jubilation of 
the ruling coalition which at that time, seemed to verge on mocking the 
Opposition with grandiose headlines and comments in the press calling it 
the "Abdullah tsunami", "resounding 'yes"', and "blue waves demolishing 
opposition". The results indeed completely reversed the faltering position 
of the BN in 1999 and has attracted a great deal of analyses on the 
underlying reasons for the unexpected failure of PAS and the Barisan 
Alternatif (BA, or Alternative Front) as well as the achievement of 
Abdullah, UMNO, and BN. Several analyses have focused on the fatal 
conditions of PAS, Keadilan, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) 
before and after the election while siinultaneously accusing the BN 
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government of electoral misconducts, much of which were seemingly 
based on rumours and unproven accusations. Unfortunately, this time 
round, the Election Commission had done a very messy job of running 
the election that resulted in several electoral inadequacies even though 
the entire electoral operation was generally accepted as fair and clean. 
This eventually cast some doubts on the results. 
While the Opposition weaknesses contributed to their dismal 
performance, several factors related to the operation and functioning 
of the ruling parties in the run up to the election must be closely and 
objectively exainined in order to fully understand BN's electoral success. 
The analysis here is mostly ethnographic, and describes observable 
situations and relates the larger issues with the general outcome of the 
recent election. Factors such as the personal appeal of the leadership, 
historical and current situatioils of the political parties, and other 
underlying dynamics are argued to have played crucial roles in the overall 
outcome of the election. The author would like to focus on the seemingly 
cohesive nature of the BN components prior to the election as the major 
contributing factor in the rout of the Opposition. This must take into 
consideration a deeply historical view of inter-party interactions among 
BN members, for history provides a better guide to understanding much 
of political behaviour. 
Outwardly, the personal appeal of Abdullah Badawi seemed to 
have a kind of counter-balancing and harinonising effect on the mind 
of the general electoratee3 The more amicable and gentle personality 
displayed by him is a contrast to the more combative Dr Mahathir. A 
genial and more compromising Abdullah seemed to sooth many feelings 
and lightened the general mood. At the same time, the BN generally 
and most of the component parties in particular displayed a great deal 
of internal cohesiveness to face the election. This is not to claim that 
there was no friction within the BN coalition which was evident within 
Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS), Sarawak National Party (SNAP), 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and even UMNO prior to 
nomination and during the election itself. Nonetheless, more than the 
Opposition parties such as Keadilan and PAS could have achieved, the 
BN components displayed greater stability and general cohesion. Above 
all, the intense utilisation of all the known strategies of inobilising and 
160 Zainal Kling 
forming public opinion by the RN, and UMNO especially, by building 
upon the persoilality icon and traits of Abdullah seemed to assure the 
voters of the commitment of their chosen leaders and the need to provide 
an overwhelming mandate for them. A resounding victory to Abdullah, 
UMNO, and the BN was called for to ensure the continued prosperity 
for Malaysia as "never been seen before". 
An analysis of the strategies of UMNO and the BN components 
in the conduct of the election would clarify several contentious issues 
related to both their victory and the failure of the Opposition. Given 
the general perception that UMNO has always played the dominant 
role in the complex relationship of the BN coalition, the focus 
must be on understanding the determining factor underlying the 
dynamics of power interplay between component members during 
the electioil as well as throughout its history from the early 1970s. 
After more than three decades of cooperation and working together, 
sharing power among their leaders, a situation frequently described as 
ccconsociationalism~' inspire of its departure from the ideal proposed by 
Areild Lijphart,' there seems to be a coinmonly-accepted fornlula of 
cooperation between them. For example, the method of seat allocation 
seemed to have found consensus among members so much so that they 
have generally managed to avoid open inter-party challenges, clashes, 
and disagreements for the sake of the common victory. This is especially 
true during the last election when all the coinponent party leaders were 
each, as usual, consulted with regards to the number of candidates to 
be fielded. Everyone expressed general satisfaction with the formula of 
allocation even if some leaders did qualify their statement, a situation 
one commentator described as a "paragon of political ~tabi l i ty" .~ 
Officially formed in June 1974 by the second prime minister, Tun 
Abdul Razak, in an attempt to avoid too much politicking within the 
Malaysian political contestation and to achieve consensus on national 
development and progress, the BN has been in existence for the last 
three decades since the formation of the UMNO-MCA alliance which 
contested the first municipal election in 1952 and later the UMNO- 
MCA-MIC alliance of 1954 to contest the first Malayan general election 
in 1955. Looking through the entire history of the alliance and coalition 
since then, the dynamics of power relationships can be understood as 
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a kind of long-term inter-group adjustment among political groups 
working closely together in power contestations. 
Historical Consciousness 
It is this dynamics of power contestations that characterised the ebb 
and flow of leadership and elite circulation among the racial groups 
in contact. Grounded in somewhat dissimilar perspectives of history 
and group posi tioiling within the entire political spectrum, the early 
attempt at cooperation in the form of the Alliance was arguably 
driven principally by a superficial but common motive of achieving 
merdeka, an objective already clearly enunciated by at least the Malay 
and Chinese groups long before Malaysia's independence. Whether 
- 
in the forin of communist insurgency or Malay nationalism, each of 
- 
them spelled out a deep-seated struggle to liberate the country and 
the "nation" from the colonial yoke. Nevertheless, the pre-war British 
colonial situation was one of global dominance in many of the colonised 
territories. The British did not entertain demands for independence 
until its defeat in the eastern war theater during World War I1 at the 
hands of the Japanese. 
It was this possibility of defeat that fired the nationalistic imagi- 
nation in many coloilised territories to demand or fight for national 
independence. Similar conditions seemed to have driven the Malays 
to talk of merdpka during pre-war days but especially more so after the 
Malayan Union. It was a project and a deliberate attempt by the British 
to betray and deprive them of their legal right and historical standing as 
the recognised ruling nation of the Malayan states within the provision 
of a series of formal treaties entered between them and Malay rulers since 
the Pangkor Treaty in 1874. With much coercion and threat to the Malay 
rulers to relinquish their sovereignty, the Malayan Union was proclaimed 
immediately after the war. The Malays reacted with emotional uproar and 
immediately and unanimously rejected the Union. This eventually led to 
the birth of UMNO. A sleepy nation was aroused into action to make a 
stand against the dictate of a global power and to reclaim their rightful 
status and sovereignty over their own country. Since then the Malay 
mind and psyche has been galvanised into an almost monolithic drive 
to safeguard sovereignty, defend unity, and lately, promote development 
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as the basis of survival within a multi-ethnic nation-state and an open 
globalised world. 
The Malay perception of sovereignty completely differentiated them 
from the ideology behind the Communist, anti-colonial stand during 
the pre-war period. Since the early 20th century, the Malays have already 
discussed and reviewed their in~poverished and weak standard of living 
- - 
vis-2-visother races, especially the Chinese, in the context of coloniali~m.~ 
- 
They were already aware of the threat to their sovereignty and the related 
- .  
consequences of poverty. There was also a reliance on the integrity of 
the British as the "protector" of Malay sovereignty within the perception 
of being a "protectorate" in the treaties signed with the various Malay 
Sultans of the Malayan states. In that context, it is wrong to regard 
British attitude and policies as being "pro-Malay" since the British were 
administrating on behalf of the Malay rulers. While British intervention - 
was already beyond mere protection and on the verge of colonisation, 
the Malays still regarded the British as  protector^.^ 
'l'he Communists were largely alien as they were focused on their 
own nationalistic ambition, reflected in their opposition to the invasion 
of China by the Japanese, beginning with Manchuria and the rest of 
China in 1937. Anti-British movements and insurgencies and the 
eventual Chinese support of the anti-Japanese movement during and 
after the war was an extension of this alien nationalism. They cannot be 
equated with Malay national consciousness since the former was related 
to territorial sovereignty based on legal and historical claim, while the 
latter is as good as colonisation by an alien ideological force over the 
Malayan states. This situation became the single most important factor 
that shaped and galvanised the mind and psyche of the Malays in general 
and the UMNO ideology particularly when they unexpectedly rose 
against the British who had long regarded them as nothing more than 
ignorant, lazy, and treacherous natives. 
The immediate post-war experience of the bleak and bloody weeks 
prior to the establishment of the British Military Administration (BMA) 
in September 1945 when the Communist assumed power in most 
Malayan townships and effected revenge against the Malays for what they 
perceived as the Malay wartime collaboration with the Japanese, gelled 
into deep suspicion and hatred of the Chinese, as reflected in clashes 
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that followed. This and other events in later years, which led to many 
inter-racial clashes even in recent times, were part of the manifestation 
of the Malay fear and deep suspicion of the "alien7' intention in their 
country and over their sovereignty. The fact that they eventually rose 
and fought against the Malayan Union, which was meant to reward 
the Chinese for their wartime efforts, became the cornerstone of their 
historical struggle to ensure continuity and perpetuity of that sovereignty. 
It was almost akin to a political "amok" for them to realise that they have 
been deprived of their rightful territorial claim merely because they have 
been accused of not being anti-Japanese and betraying the British to the 
detriment of British colonial power, sentiment, and pride. 
To the Malays, both the British and the Japanese were colonials. 
Inspite of the suffering experienced by other races during the Japanese 
occupation, the Malays were promised freedom after the war and saw this 
possibility with the defeat of the British. The Japanese occupation and the 
imposition of an alien agenda on their sovereignty shaped the Malay mind 
and their perception of politics and political power in relation to "others". 
The fact that UMNO was the most important political party to fight 
for and assume the protection of Malay rights since the Malayan Union 
debacle, has implanted in the Malay mind the singular role of UMNO 
as the only reliable Malay party. To its advantage, UMNO has replayed 
and manipulated this tune. While the 1999 election has somewhat 
challenged this perception, PAS nevertheless remained very cautious and 
sceptical of their ability to encroached into the "Malay sovereignty" mind. 
PAS challenge to this "sovereignty", through its concept of the universal 
Islamic state, has been regarded as a deviation from the Malay cause and 
were accused of "betrayal" especially when they embraced the DAP in 
the RA alliance, which has clearly and openly rejected the Malay claim 
of sovereignty and primacy in their concept of "Malaysian Malaysia". To 
a certain extent, UMNO has also manipulated and countered an earlier 
accusation by PAS of UMNO being kafir (infidels) for having shared 
their power with the MCA and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) now 
that they are involved in an identical coalition. 
This deep-seated historical pattern constituting the Malay psyche 
generally and UMNO in particular became a dynamic force in shaping 
the interaction of UMNO with the various political parties within the 
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BN. Dato' Onn bin Ja'afar relied heavily on the Malay sense of historical 
justice when he rallied Malays to unite and persuaded them to reject 
and oppose the Malayan Union in his campaign across the country, and 
finally formed UMNO in the palace of the Johore SultanR on 1 March 
1946. Tunku Abdul Rahman has been regarded as more liberal, yet his 
reliance on history was uilmistakable during the period of challenges 
from the People's Action Party (PAP) in the Malaysian parliament early 
in Malaysian history and even in later years.'This dynamic was followed 
even more consciously by Tun Abdul Razak and subsequent Malay 
leaders and UMNO." 
In this respect, much of the political analyses have also been slow to 
explain and clarify several issues relating to fluctuations in the relationship 
between UMNO, BN and the components of the BA. While current 
factors have an immediate effect in swaying public opinion especially 
during election campaigns, yet collective memories of past events and 
ideological and historical causes have a significant impact on the electoral 
outcome - history frequently plays a very significant role in the strategies 
and manipulation of campaign issues. The 1969 Kuala Lumpur riot has 
become the bedrock of reminders and emotional orchestration during 
election campaigns ever since its occurrence to this day. History is the 
spectre of influence in the oscillation of perception determining many 
political choices. In the Malaysian political dynamics, this point must 
always be taken into consideration to u~lderstand the mind of inter-party 
and inter-racial players. 
Another significant element to be considered for a inore meaningful 
assessment of Malaysia's future, specifically that of the relationship of 
UMNO and BN under the new leadership of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 
is the legacy of Dr Mahathir whose image and rule" cast a huge shadow 
on the possible method of administration by Abdullah. Perhaps it is 
still too early to observe and understand the impact of the Mahathir 
legacy and the probable achieve~nent of Abdullah's administration as it 
has only been a year since his ascendancy. While policies and intentions 
have already been stated and generally spelled out as one of continuity 
from preceding policy statements, yet subtle changes or modifications 
have already been put in place. A number of so-called mega-projects 
have been discontinued, corruption has become the biggest target, 
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and administrative integrity and personal responsibility have been 
stressed. However, at this juncture, they are at best rhetoric and perhaps 
empty promises. Observers are still in doubt and waiting for concrete 
evidence of, for instance, tackling corruption and inefficiency within the 
government. A minister in the Prime Minister's Office has conlnlented on 
high profile cases that have yet to be indicted in court.12 Several cases of 
shoddy public works by contractors have been ear-marked for blacklisting 
and legal indemnity for uncompleted construction projects. 
The short time frame since Abddlah assumed the role of prime 
minister, therefore, does not do justice to the analysis of the political 
culture animating Abdullah's leadership especially in relation to the 
influence he might have on inter-party interaction within the BN and 
the entire Malaysian political culture. Never theless, his involvement 
in politics for more than two decades would already provide ample 
indication of the probable steps he may take in the future." 
Inevitably also, in order to counter-balance the lack of depth as a 
result of the short time frame of Abdullah's administration, a broader 
and more longitudinal analysis that examines a period spanning several 
leaders than the current leadership alone is needed. Although the 2004 
election results will demonstrate certain conditions and trends of voting 
behaviour and inter-group political dynamics, they do not make up 
the total consequence or a functional inter-play of the current political 
climate. The author believes that other significant factors have been 
influenced by historical variables which have been sharply mobilised to 
achieve political victory and justification for the exercise of options and 
clloices within the con~plex interactions ofconstituting groups in the BN. 
The length of history studied may not be necessarily lengthy. Even the 
conventional practices of the last four decades since the emergence of the 
Alliance and the BN coalition would suffice to justify the basis of current 
decisions. It may be presumed that such a practice must have been cited 
in order to achieve the kind of smooth acceptance of political consensus 
on the allocation of seats to candidates during the recent election. 
The Mahathir Legacy 
The Mahathir administration in Malaysia was phenomenal. After more 
than two decades, Dr Mahathir has, in the words of C. Kessler, "created 
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a world in his own image, according to ideas and visions made possible 
yet also constrained, perhaps even foreshortened or distorted, by his 
own mental and intellectual horizons".14 This "rule" has been called 
c c  
personalised", "paradoxical", "semi-democratic", and "authoritarian" by 
critics. Yet it can be agreed that he left a tremendous legacy particularly 
in raising the Malay confidence through material and occupational 
achievements. To the Malays, he has been considered a guiding light, 
providing a strong vision for achieving possibilities unheard of in life. 
The job of running and developing the country into a recognisable 
global player necessitated the presence of a strong and visionary leader 
and like many of such leaders in developing countries, Mahathir was 
never absolutely regarded as an ccauthoritarian" by supporters, especially 
among his Malay supporters. Although there were opposing voices and 
accusations of Mahathir being mah~zalim (very cruel) and "pharaohnic" 
(oppressive) mainly by the opposition, his policies found favour with a 
forgiving general public. The perception was that he has been very tegas 
(steadfast and unfaltering), berdisplin (disciplinary), and berani (brave) 
in his inission of raising the merttrbtrt (status) and harkat (dignity) of the 
nation. Businesses particularly favoured Dr Mahathir's policies as they 
were seen to sopport the general economic development and prosperity 
of the country. This was presumably one of the major contributing factors 
which provided electoral support for the BN in the 1999 election.15 
Undoubtedly, he has left a perpetual and indelible mark on the Malaysian 
political landscape and the psyche of Malaysians. 
Of particular significance is his well-known visionary framework for 
future development initially known as "The Way Forward", later came 
to be popularly cited as The Wsion 2020, which defined, in very general 
tenns, the vision of a developed Malaysia for the next couple of decades. 
Prior to this, Dr Mahathir had implemented various policies and changes 
in all areas of administration such as the bureaucracy, judiciary, economy, 
politics and had even amended certain sections of the Constitution to 
achieve what he has personally visualised as the meails towards achieving 
the goals of democracy and development. Until the final days of his 
prime ministership, he was still trying to put in place a new national 
school system to achieve his vision of a united Malaysia of the future. 
At the same time, he was still travelling to other countries within the 
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Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC) and Non-Aligned Move- 
ment (NAM) blocks to persuade others to put up a united front in 
facing the current realities of unipolar global politics of the US. 
Mahathirism,'"~ some analysts would call it, has worked in ways 
that many Malaysians regarded as generally beneficial. It has laid down 
fundamental structures in the political, economic, socio-cultural, and 
religious domains. They have become the foundation of many areas of 
administration that any successor would find difficult to replace. For this 
reason, it is most significant that his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 
when asked what his vision would be after the smooth handover of the 
count]-y's leadership, replied unequivocally, "My vision for Malaysia is 
Vision 2020."'7 Perhaps Abdullah has other option to offer immediately 
after the transfer but to remain locked within the general framework of 
various Mahathirian policies and structures. It was very obvious that such 
a stance would only push him to an unprecedented situation of a weak 
leader, tied down and enmeshed within a network of existing policies 
and merely playing the role of an implementer. 
Abdullah, however, did not wait long before spelling out his own 
brand of leadership by coi~sulting and requesting from the people for 
a very strong mandate to continue with the development and growth 
of the country. He created a personal vision, seemingly tempered with 
deep-rooted ideas within the Islamic political traditions which was also 
considered to be a de~nocratic and civil vision of the siyyasah syariah 
system, when he loudly proclaimed on his first arrival as prime minister at 
the Bayan Lepas airport, Penang, his home state: "This is my hope. I do 
not ask ofyou to work for me but work with me for the sake of the nation 
and ~ountry ."~ '  This utterance immediately became the slogan of the 
new government and the prime iniilister. Subsequently, when he decided 
to call for a general election on 15 March 2004, the call to "work with 
me" became the party's catch word which was eventually transformed 
into a political manifesto with "excellence, glory, and determination" 
(cemerlang, gemilnng, terbilang) as the for~llula for moving beyond the 
Mahathirian glorious years. 
The mood was, therefore, set for an open and more inclusive 
government by a very subtle but clear shift from the pervasiveness of the 
Mahathirian legacy. At once, a feeling of relief and muttered easiness 
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among all classes of people seemed to emerge now that "Pak Lah" (as 
he is dearly addressed) would be more answerable to the people. This 
was a deliberate change in style of leadership or "de-Mahathirisation" as 
some would call it, and certainly was a test of confidence of the people 
and willingness to provide a mandate in the general election. 
Speculation was rife that an election would be called during 2003, just 
before the year end Hqj (pilgrimage) when many Muslims, presumably 
supporters of PAS, would be away. Previously, the Islamic party had 
challenged the venerable position of UMNO and the BN in the Malay 
heartland, and this caused some anxiety within the BN government for 
the upcoming election. The 1999 election results had quickly sent the 
massage that UMNO was already very vulnerable which was, to an extent, 
weakened by PAS'S "green wave". The Malays and especially the younger 
generation were rejecting and abandoning their "protector" and their 
racial politics for more democratic and just political parties. Keadilan 
has emerged as a symbol of political participation of the youth following 
the exhortation of Anwar Ibrahim, the ex-deputy premier, who was 
taken to court for misuse of power and sexual misconduct by Mahathir 
and dismissed from the party and the government in late 1998. This 
presumably was a big mistake which finally found its fateful impact in 
the Malay heartland with the lost of Trengganu and the strengthening 
of PAS position in Kelantan and in all Malay majority states in the 1999 
election. Keadilan therefore became an alternative party for Malays 
against the UMNO and BN racial politics. 
UMNO's reaction was predictable. While PAS was seen as riding 
the crest of the Anwar wave of general dissatisfaction as well as 
manipulating religious issues in the name of Islamic religiosity and 
piety, there was a feeling of UMNO's loss of relevance to the Malay 
cause. Inspite of Mahathir's success in raising Malay dignity and econ- 
omic well-being, he also seemed to have abandoned the rural Malays 
through an overemphasis on industrial development and sidelining 
cultural issues dear to Malays especially the replacement of Malay 
with English as the language of instruction of the sciences in schools. 
There was a feeling of general neglect by the Malays in favour of 
Chinese causes with the extension of private higher education, a 
reminder of the tightly-fought case of Merdeka University in 1987, 
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and industrialisation which benefited mostly Chinese businesses and 
small-scale industries. 
Keadilan, on the other hand, has been the focus of UMNO's public 
campaign within the context of traditional cultural and Islamic values. 
Keadilan has been accused of inculcating ungratefulness among the 
younger Malay professionals whose university education within and 
outside the country has been almost totally sponsored by the government. 
To forget the government's commitment towards their well-being is 
considered, to use the proverbial saying, kachung lupukun kulit - the 
ungrateful pods of peanuts. This ungrateful attitude was coilfounded by 
another accusation of gross disregard for the Islamic teaching of syzikur 
(ever grateful to God). Such a teaching reflects the false claim of Anwar 
as an Islamic reformer who misled the youth. Destructive actions of 
Keadilan members during their den~onstrations were portrayed as the 
work of deviants that justify much of the physical and legal actions taken 
against them during most of their protests. 
UMNO regarded them as a threat of divisiveness towards Malay 
society which would open incisive opportunities for other "races" to 
split and weaken Malay unity. This was the view eventually taken by 
U M N O  when the Suqui 83 demands were made during the 1999 
election. While the Suqui demands, which questioned issues such as the 
granting of economic assistance solely to ethnic Malays, were not publicly 
well-known during the election, it was known in the newspapers after 
the election as something of a "hell break loose", and the uproar created 
was heated enough for Dr Mahathir, then prime minister, to retract 
whatever had been said much earlier and to decide that the demands 
were against the "social contract" of the Constitution. Since then, the 
idea of a social coiltract has come to the foreground as a reminder of the 
very basis for inter-party relationship in the BN. The perceived threat to 
Malay sovereignty made the demands unacceptable. This threat remains a 
sensitive issue and a challenge to Malay politics. This was the underlying 
fear that drove U M N O  to undertake strategic action and mobilisation 
of opinion after the 1999 election debacle. 
Given that the Malay votes were already fragmented and Malay unity 
was threatened, several strategic positions were undertaken by the BN 
to deny PAS of its Islamic content: 
Zainal Kling 
1. PAS was just another political party and not an Islamic party. 
UMNO highlighted several occasions where PAS leadership had 
uttered vulgar and distasteful remarks against UMNO defying 
Islamic teachings. Such remarks include calling fellow Muslims 
kafir (infidels), tughut (idolaters), and "Yahudi" ( jews), and 
allowing vulgar reinarks by either Nik Aziz or Hadi Awang to be 
carried in mainstream newspapers, publicising their irreligious 
and uncalled for behaviour as ulama and pious political leaders. 
At the height of PAS'S confidence, Nik Aziz even alluded to 
"working with Satan" if it could win them votes. Of course, 
he and Hadi Awang embraced DAPYs party leader, Lim Keat 
Siang, during that period, but the latter eventually rejected 
PAS'S "Islamic state" ideology. Even more serious were some of 
the blaspheinous remarks by Nik Aziz in equating God with 
"gangsters" and attributing God with using vulgar words. This 
was a war of attrition with Dr Mahathir to win the spiritual 
heart of the Malays. 
2. UMNOYs tactic of equating a vote for PAS based on Islamic 
salvation as blaspheinous. Throughout the years, PAS has been 
giving ceramah (speeches) either in open rallies, on their own 
premises, or in surax (prayer houses). Many of the ceramah were 
not rational analyses of the BN and UMNO government but 
jocular remarks on government personalities and progranlnles. 
Yet this appealed to the audience who were mainly PAS 
members from other districts who came to listen to the "latest 
jokes". Typical of these ceramah were those held at the party 
headquarters in Gombak, Kuala Lumpur. A common theine 
that ilormally ruils through such speeches is that human beings 
would have to face God's judgment afier death. The implication 
is that only PAS can help a Muslim attain salvation and therefore 
a vote for PAS is a ticket to salvation in the world of the dead 
(alum barzah). Presuinably this campaign hit its mark among 
rural Muslims who gave them overwhelming votes in the Malay 
heartland. This promise of salvation was eventually used by the 
BN to demonised PAS of its blaspheme. 
3. Denied PAS the use of szirau (prayer houses) and mosques for 
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anti-goverilment campaigns and restrict the circulatioil of its 
newspaper - Harakah. The szlrau and mosques are under the 
administration of religious departments and councils which by 
law are within the jurisdiction of the Sultan as head of state, 
who have often issued religious instructions to disallow anti- 
government speeches and khutbah (sermons). Members of the 
Committee of Administration of each prayer house were also 
threatened with dismissal for their discretion to allow such 
campaigns. When newspapers published the misdeeds of PAS, 
suran committees allowed anti-government campaigning and 
not religious sermons or teachings. When Harakah published 
news regarded as firnab (slander, libel, and defamation), it was 
almost suspended. It was allowed to continue for the readership 
of its members and for weekly publication. 
4. A11 attempt at reconciliation with PAS to preserve unity at 
the behest of Malay intellectuals. A call was made by several 
intellectuals for unity of Malays and for the leaderships to 
come together to air their colnmon concern for Islam and the 
Malays instead of causing divisiveiless among Malays. The 
attempt was met with unenthusiasm among PAS members 
who felt that they should not compromise with U M N O .  
U M N O  on the other hand treated the idea with caution 
and apparently rehearsed the meeting which was videotaped. 
Eventually, nothing came out  of the move except for an 
uneventful participation by Dr Mahathir and Fadzil Noor in a 
forum on Palestine. Nonetheless, the call reflected the common 
concern of various sectors in the Malay society concerning unity 
and its probable divisiveness. Similar efforts were undertaken 
earlier in the 1980s when disunity appeared on issues related to 
the amendment to the Constitution, deregistration of WMNO - 
and the resignation of leaders froin the government. Unity and 
its probable impact on sovereignty remained a inajor concern 
of the Malay community and UMNO.  
The strategy adopted in relation to Keadilan was to portray it as a 
party lacking in real substance, and that their sole objective was to obtain 
a release for Anwar from impending court appearances and probable 
conviction. At the same time, internal squabbles among the leaders 
within Keadilan were fully highlighted to sow the seeds of dissatisfaction 
and incredulity among its supporters. The incessant attacks probably 
created, to a certain extent, internal dissent among senior leaders that 
eve~l tual l~  ed to breakaways and resignations that weakened Keadilan 
considerably. 
Simultaneously, a special government information agency was 
reorganised and given the specific task of clarifying government policies 
and action to the public especially the Malays. Year-long ceramah and 
courses were conducted in all states to convince the Malays of the 
efficacy of U M N O  as their only hope for progress and development. 
A decade of non-development in Kelantan and probably Trengganu 
by the PAS government was cited as having only led them to poverty, 
underdevelopment, and stagnation. Developmentalism remained the 
major basis of the campaign for the Malay heart and mind in spite of 
rebuttals by PAS as a non-convincing issue. In Trengganu, the "blue 
wave" programme of Islam H~zdhari, in contrast to PAS'S "Islamic state" 
ideology, was introduced to spearhead the challenge and provide a 
modern conceptual alternative to PAS orthodoxy. Finally, D r  Mahathir 
made the daring declaration that Malaysia is already an Islamic state, 
thus, PAS'S drive for an Islamic state was redundant. In this respect, 
PAS and Keadilan has had to constantly face the ruling government's 
actions both in tactical and legal terms throughout the inter-electoral 
years. 
The non-Malays, on the other hand, were enticed to support U M N O  
through more liberal econonlic, political, cultural, and education 
policies and promises. Industrialisation and economic development have 
benefited Chinese businesses tremendously and contributed to their 
regained superiority in the share of the national economy. The degree 
of Chinese participation in Cabinet decision-making and power-sharing 
was increased and a channel to the prime minister was opened with 
the appointment of a Chinese political secretary in order to keep him 
informed of Chinese issues. Chinese cultural activities were encouraged 
and Chinese New Year celebrations were raised to that of a national 
celebration with the presence of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Private 
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education was opened up, allowing for the Chinese to acquire educational 
qualifications. This was further relaxed with the granting of university 
status to their professional college, the Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
Finally, their demand for meritocracy in educational placement was 
implemented in all public universities and 10 per cent of the total seats 
were allocated to the Chinese in the Mara Junior Science College which 
was, up till then, exclusively for the Malays. Perhaps, in answer to many 
demands for equality, a subtle criticism of special rights and privileges 
accorded to the Malays was publicly made as a persistent reminder to 
the Malays not to depend so much on government assistance and to do 
away with a subsidy mentality. Therefore, several policy adjustments were 
tactical in winning non-Malay votes which, to some extent, determined 
the balance of power for the BN and U M N O  in the election. 
In reality, the BN and U M N O  leadership were never demoralised 
after the 1999 election debacle, even with the lost of Trengganu. Dr 
Mahathir immediately launched several political steps to recover lost 
ground. These steps included blocking the distribution of royalty" of 
Petronas, the national oil company, to Trengganu, withdrawal of financial 
support for private religious schools which purportedly supported PAS, 
and proclaimed Malaysia as an Islamic state to outbid the PAS manifesto. 
A series of meetings with state muftir (highest religious authority) 
were organised to cajole them into making statements rebutting 
PAS pronouncements on religious matters. Seminars at national and 
international levels were also organised to defend the Islamic constitution 
of the government. 
In addition, BN's achievements in Islamic development were 
higlllighted frequently. Within the concept of social Islamic development 
or fardhzc kifyuh, the Islamic banking system, insurance (tukuficl), 
credit system, and pawn institutions were frequently highlighted as the 
crowning examples of Malaysia's Islamic governance. The Institute for 
Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM) was tasked to deliberate on 
various issues froin an Islamic perspective. A series of national seminars 
on "The Closing of Malay Mind" were organised to combat and win 
over the minds of staunch PAS supporters. 
News blitzkrieg was undertaken to nullify PAS achievements. The 
government media machine constailtly aired and reported on any 
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shortcomings of the two states under PAS. There were reports of an - 
increase in crime, cases of Muslims becoming apostates in Kelantan, 
increasing prostitution in Kelantan, poverty and declining employment, 
and Kelantan's dependence on remittances from their migrants who 
work in other states. Even television programmes were geared towards 
increasing viewership in the east coat states through Sakzm Pantai Timzrr 
("Hello East Coast"). However, inspite of all these initiatives, there was 
still a great deal of uncertainty with regards the support of the Malays by 
the time D r  Mahathir announced his retirement in 2003. This did not 
help U M N O  to prepare for the 2004 election. A series of by-elections 
in Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, and Kedah also did not fully reveal their 
political leanings. 
September 11 contributed an unexpected gift to U M N O .  It 
provided a moral legitimacy for the detention of several opposition 
members and pro-Islamic militants, some of whom were related to 
PAS leaders. It captured the imagination of the non-Malays who later 
rejected PAS and its support of the DAP The DAP understood the 
implications and reminded PAS of the changing climate of opinion of 
the idea of an "Islamic state". However, PAS refused to budge on this 
issue and the DAP had no choice but to leave the BA which considerably 
weakened the fragile coalition of the BA. As the election drew near, 
Keadilan suffered defections from its senior leadership and eventually 
its survival was called into question. This whole situation contributed 
towards the failure of the Opposition as a whole to mount a concerted 
challenge to the BN. 
Abdullah was very mindful of the public mood and understood 
the Malay issues well. In the 2003 UMNO annual general assembly, 
he addressed the delegates as well as the "the ordinary members who 
are not in our midst". He purposely mentioned the latter to emphasise 
that their interests were very much in his heart. He recognised that he 
needed a spectacular formula to win back the Malay vote which has 
been eroded to the extent that all the grassroots support was threatened 
with the possibility of having for the first time an Islamic government in 
power. ?'he PAS euphoria was echoed everywhere even in neighbouring 
countries, and the PAS leadership began to allude to such a possibility 
with confidence. 
7: UMNO and BN in the 2004 Election 1 75 
By the time of the transfer of stewardship in October 2003, Abdullah 
knew he needed to gather the support of all the people behind him as a 
demonstration of his mandate to govern. At that time, his position was 
merely a shadow of an untested popularity without electoral legitimacy 
More importantly, he needed to obtain the real support of the Malays 
which at its core is the fouildation of UMNO. 
During the inter-election years, especially after the move to modify 
the language policy and putting English as the medium of instruction 
for science subjects in primary schools in 2002, U M N O  had been 
openly accused of abandoning the Malay cause. The  refusal of 
Dr Mahathir to listen to the plea of Malay cultural organisations on 
this issue led many to accuse UMNO of abandoning Malay constitu- 
tional and cultural rights. Many fol-mally left U M N O  to join Keadilan 
and PAS. PAS tried to exploit the issue to the full which was considered 
contrary to universal Islamic ideology to identify totally with ethnic 
and sectarian cultural issues. Nevertheless, they organised a cultural 
show in Kota Bharu and dubbed it as the real MalaylIslamic cultural 
presentation. 
While Abdullah uilderstood and tried hard to diffuse the discontent, 
he made no move to undercut Dr Mahathir on the language issue. In 
his report to the prime minister after several meetings with various 
cultural groups including some of the more prominent associations such 
as Gapena, Peilinsular Malay Students Federation (GPMS), Muslim 
Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and Malay teachers associations, 
he alluded to the general dissatisfaction of the Malays. In his typical 
mode of combative politics, Dr Mahathir accused the opposing groups 
as linguistic chauvinists and threatened them with the ISA. He disinissed 
the complaints as being unduly etnotioilal and improper for the Malay 
race in the face of globalisation. 
In summary, several outstanding major issues were already weighing 
heavily as legacy for the new prime minister. There seemed to be no 
honeymoon for him in the face of a threatening on-coming general 
election. The electorate was still vague and uncertain in its support. The 
threat of the Opposition winning the election was therefore real and it 
was probably already a situation of political quicksand, ready to suck 
the unmindful players. 
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Change and Continuity 
The few months prior to and after the 2004 general election were 
certainly a period of stress and one of confidence-building for Abdullah 
after two decades of Mahathirian economic achievements. As part 
of the election promises, senior government officers and ex-CEOs of 
government-linked corporations (GLC) were allowed to be tried in court 
for breach of trust and corruption. Abdullah has been known as "Mr 
Clean7'. He needed to demonstrate a certain quality of steadfastness and 
resolve to muster support to face the major challenges in the coming 
election. He needed to make some radical changes while remaining 
outwardly supportive of existing policies. At least certain new emphases 
must be made to demonstrate the emergence of a new leadership with 
a clear mandate. 
Two major points of contention were on his mind even before the 
power transfer: corruption and Islamic challenges. He has championed 
the move for a strong anti-corruption stance and closely related to that 
was the build up of an ethical base upon which the country must move 
forward and be able to handle the two international organisations which 
Malaysia is heading: the OIC and the NAM. Both moves are in fact part 
and parcel of a new political strategy that he was beginning to reveal. 
After his first Cabinet meeting, he announced the need to form what he 
called the National Integrity Plan "which is a comprehensive framework 
in which best practices, new mechanisms, committees and structures 
would be formalized and implemented to promote good governance, 
particularly within the public sector,"'" and to build a Malaysian Institute 
for Integrity with the major function of collecting data on national 
integrity, continuous monitoring of the processes of corruption, and 
make policy recommendations to the governmeilt on how to increase 
national integrity. The Cabinet secretary began planning for both 
objectives and both prograinlnes were launched on 23 April 2004." 
Then, on 3 December 2003, he proposed the setting up of the 
Anti-Corruption Academy for which the government allocated a sum 
of RM17 million. There were also sweeping actions initiated to clean 
local authorities of corrupt officials and place the tender system under 
a transparent and open system for interested bidders. He also began 
to take note of some of the salient comments made on the so-called 
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mega-projects, most of which were approved earlier by D r  Mahathir. 
As a result he postponed the RM 16 billion project of laying a double 
tract for the railways and restructuring the Bakun hydroelectric 
construction equity. This was part of the need to close the widening 
budget deficit of which he personally was not in favour as a mechanism 
of development. 
Another major initiative was the forination of the Royal Commission 
for the Improvement of the Police Force in late December 2003. He 
gave the widest possible power to the commission to reassess the role of 
the force, its operating procedures, recruitment, and training practices. 
Its primary aim is to end brutality and graft within the ranks, while 
increasing professionalism and instilling a greater respect for human 
rights. For that purpose, two ex-lord presidents were selected, with one 
as chairman, together with several independent members including 
the more vociferous chairman of the Bar Council. It was certainly a 
very surprising move on his part. Being the minister of internal affairs, 
it would reflect his failure to whip the police force into a clean and 
efficient organisation and yet he was now proposing the set up of the 
conlmissio~ls to overhaul the force thoroughly. This move was largely 
received favourably by the public. 
Abdullah has therefore made several radical moves to achieve a clean 
and fair government early in his leadership which was also the objective 
of Mahathir when he took office in the middle of 1981 through the 
well-known slogan "bersib, cekap, ~manab"(clean, efficient, trustworthy). 
There seemed to be a degree of continuity between the two leaders at least 
in their stated intentions. It was certainly received positively by concerned 
Malaysians and has beell the bellchinark of the new government. Illspite 
of the good intention, Mahathir's rule over the previous two decades 
have been marked by a number of financial and economic blunders, 
political turmoil, and more importantly, socio-cultural degeneration 
into the dark alleys of corruption. 
Islamic Challenges 
One of the inajor problems left behind by the Mahathir administration 
was the Islamic issue. Thro~~ghou t  its history, U M N O  has always been 
troubled by the presence of PAS as an alternative Malay party. Although 
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UMNO has totally rejected the possibility of creating Malaysia as an 
Islamic state, the persistence of PAS to advocate it and question the 
legitimacy of UMNO as the party of Malays (being Muslims) occasionally 
touched a sensitive nerve within the party. As a result Tun Abdul Razak, 
the second prime minister and president of UMNO, incorporated PAS 
as part of a "Government of National Unity" which later became the 
BN in 1974. This lasted for a while until 1977 when PAS withdrew 
from the coalition largely due to the rivalry they had with UMNO in 
the state of Kelantan where PAS ruled. The federal government took 
over the administration of Kelantan when violent demonstrations and 
looting erupted in the state capital, Kota Bharu. This direct intervention 
enabled U M N O  to capture Kelantan from PAS but created disunity 
among Malay supporters of both parties. 
The 1970s were marked by the rise in Islanlic revivalism around the 
world. Radical Muslim dakwab (missionary) groups appeared along with 
the more orthodox Perkim (Persatuan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia). They 
included urban middle-class groups and university students headed by 
U M N O  leaders such as Sunusi Junid and a young student leader Anwar 
Ibrahim, the Tab& movement as an off-shoot of the Indian sub- 
continental group, and the Darul Arqirm, a mass movement of various 
memberships from professionals to small-time traders and university 
students. At the same time, a number of smaller groups emerged to 
demand a purer Islamic life and destroy "infidel symbols" by attacking 
Hindu temples as well as capturing police stations to demonstrate 
millenarian (al-Mdhdi) revivalism. By the end of the 1970s, Iran broke 
in an influential fundamentalist Islamic revolution, overthrowing the 
Shah dynasty and becoming a source of inspiration for Muslims at large 
as a symbol of Islamic government. This inspired orthodox PAS uhma 
(religious leaders) to adopt a more radical stance for an Islamic state for 
Malaysia which only gelled into a more coherent formula two decades 
later, during Abdullah's premiership. 
By the early 1980s, a new brand of radical Islam took over the PAS 
leadership under Dato' Asri Muda whose stance was more nationalistic, 
in line with UMNO. 'This new brand of Islam gave rise to young 
advocates such as Fadzil Noor and Haji Hadi Awang. They played 
the role of ideologists within PAS and began more open and scathing 
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attacks on the lack of religiosity of UMNO, and thus increasing the 
rivalry and conflict within the Malay community. This culminated 
in the prescription by Hadi Awang in the late 1980s when he decried 
UMNO as kafir (infidels) and that the blood of U M N O  members were 
halal (permissible) to be shed. Since then, U M N O  has viewed PAS as 
an enemy to be discredited if not destroyed. Attempts were presumably 
made to create a rift within the PAS leadership particularly between the 
more genial Nik A~iz ,  the Tuan Guru (religious teacher) and chairman 
of the Ulama Council, and Hadi Awang, the fire-brand president who 
replaced Fadzil Noor after his untimely death in 2003. Hadi Awang 
constantly came under attack for much of what he had to say. A column 
in the litusan Malaysia newspaper devoted and constantly highlighted 
his shortcomings in Islamic affairs. In the end, he came to be seen as an 
arrogant lender who needed to be replaced. 
Meanwhile, Dr  Mahathir made his impact on the global stage by 
highlighting the modernity and moderateness of Islam in Malaysia 
inspite of his questionable labelling of the country as a "fundamentalist 
Islail~ic state", signalling a return to the true interpretation of Islam as a 
peaceful (salam) religion. A series of national and international seminars 
participated by well-known scholars were organised to support the 
contention. It was of course strongly criticised by PAS who rejected the 
contention. Nevertheless, U M N O  continued with this strategy, after 
which the DAP came into the forefront as a strong Opposition which 
they tried to propagate in Ipoh. 
O n  taking over the leadership, Abdullah's strategy in the face of 
the PAS threat and apparent popular appeal among the Malay peasants 
and new professionals, was to disassociate from the combative stance 
adopted by Mahathir. He was more approachable and avoided playing 
to the galley of the PAS leadership. Biting comments by Hadi on his 
role as imam in prayers was regarded as trivial. He was more concerned 
with the larger issue of providing a clear and imaginative alternative to 
PAS'S "Islamic state" programme. Finally, he made his stand on Islam by 
redefining the civilisational role of Islam or Islam Hadhari as suggested 
by modern Islamic thinkers. He went even further to depict not only the 
historical role of Islam as a civilised ideology but, more importantly, on 
the modem role of creating harmony and peace with others in the face 
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of very real challenges at the global level. As such he made it a key point 
to assert the civilisiilg function of religion in his formulation of a strategy 
to face the challenge of the "Islamic state" by PAS. The publication of 
PAS's concept of the "Islamic state" in December 2003 provided the 
much needed bullet for his subtle attack on the Opposition's strategy 
and progralnmes which he dismissed as "anachronistic and outdated". 
Much of the formulation had already been achieved by U M N O  and 
the BN government for many years since merdeka." There was a streak 
of confidence in his remarks that PAS had nothing new to offer in their 
programme, except "to fish for votes in the coming election". 
Therefore, Islam Hadban' was propagated to define the U M N O  
version of Islam in the face of challenges. It was not merely a 
specific strategy for outbidding PAS but a general framework for the 
development of the M~isl i i l~ ummah in the modern world, away from 
the violent trend of jihad and militaristic options undertaken by many 
Islamic groups the world over, the most famous of which is al-Qaeda of 
west Asia and Jumaah lslamiah of Southeast Asia. Even within Malaysia, 
the experience of militant movements since the communist revolt in 1948 
and the al-Maunah and KMM attempts at jihadin 2002 and 2003 have 
provided valuable informatioil on the objectives and organisation of the 
groups. Most of them were bent on adopting the violent interpretation 
of jihadas a Qur'anic injunction. But Abdullah as well as Dr  Mahathir 
openly criticised and disavowed the violent streak in the Islamic jihadist 
movement. As such the formulation and propagation of Islam Hadhari 
provided the needed framework for the Muslim community to move 
forward in Islamic terms and for non-Muslim citizens to understand 
the peaceful mission of Islain and ~ r o b a b l ~  accept it as the rallying call 
for the new government. 
Islam Hndhnri was first proposed in 2001 by several Islamic 
thinkers within U M N O  who grappled with the loss of 22 seats, the 
defeat of senior U M N O  figures, and PAS's win of a state government 
seat in the 1999 general election. A special information unit was 
formed within the Ministry of Information to combat the growing 
violent message of Islam by various factions in society and members 
of PAS. Islamic programmes were launched to search for the most 
appropriate strategy and to reduce the effect of the message of 
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violence. By 2002, Abdullah, as the then deputy prime minister, 
began to speak of Islarn Hndhari as a general concept for Islamic 
development, in line with the thoughts of several renown world 
Islamic thinkers such as Yusuf Qardawi, Muhammad Amarah, and 
Sy. Mohamad al-Ghazali. These thinkers were regarded as the modern 
manifestation of earlier Islamic reformists such as Jamaluddin al- 
Afghani, Muhainmad Abduh, and Rashid Redha whose influence had 
made an impact on Islamic reformist movements in many Muslim 
states during the colonial period. 
Nevertheless, PAS did not sit quietly with the propagation of Islam 
Hndhari. They began to attack the concept as bi'dah, revisionism of 
Islamic tenets and injunctions - and highlighted the failure of the 
concept to relate the foundation of Islam to the syariah law and its 
necessity in an Islanlic state. A roadshow was undertaken among its 
members to spread the message that Iskzm Hadhariwas haram (unlawful) 
under Islamic sydrinh law. It is a new Islam, departing from the truth. 
Abdullah, on the other hand, mobilised the special Islamic Information 
Unit to explain the concept to various interest groups. Finally, it became 
the slogan for the general election in the heartland of Malay voters. 
Abdullah Badawi's Islam Hndhari made its point as the rallying call for 
the development of the Muslim and the non-Muslim party components 
began to take notice of the Islam Hadhdri agenda and examined the 
implications of the project. In his usual style, Abdullah assured non- 
Muslims that "[als a Prime Minister of Malaysia, I am not a leader of 
Muslims, but a Muslim leader of all Malaysians."" He  was aware that 
the deep skepticism of non-Muslims would have an impact on Islamic 
ideas withill the country and as such he assured the people that he had 
no other agenda. Nevertheless, the MCA and Gerakan were still sceptical 
of the implications of the idea. 
The idea had been the centerpiece of sloganeering during the first 
by-election on 28 August 2004 in Kuala Berang, Trenganu, where the 
BN won the seat with an increase in majority. Simultaneously in Kota 
Bharu, PAS had its annual assembly in which, for the first time, party 
members, especially from the Youth Movement, openly criticised the 
leadership of Haji Hadi Awang as failing in his duty to clarify the party's 
weaknesses and setbacks during the recent general election. PAS was 
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presumably demoralised and Hadi's comment further placed the younger 
generation in a state ofdisbelief when he likened them to Coca-Cola, the 
temporary wheezing of carbonate out of a bottle which has been reduced 
to quietness. Perhaps, Abdullah now has the upper hand in the political 
arena of Malaysia after 12 months at the helm of the nation. 
Managing a Coalition 
The coalition of 14 major ethnic political parties of the BN is not 
a simple comiilg together of various groups." More than any other 
combination, it is a dynamic coalition of racial groups whereby each 
group understands and upholds their ethnic mission. While the major 
groups are avowedly racial in their membership, catering for specific 
major racial groups in the country, there are members who are avowedly 
less racial. They maintain a certain degree of mixture in memberships 
although the majority and core inembers are from one racial group. 
UMNO, MCA, MIC, and Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) are by 
definition racial parties. Several others such as Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) 
and Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) consists of Kadazandusuns, and the 
People Progressive Party (PPP) largely consist of Indians. Although the 
Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP) consists mainly of Orang 
Ulus, they are only non-racial in name as their members are from one of 
the major races in the country. Only Gerakan, United Pasokmomogun 
Kadazandusun Murut Organization (UPKO), and Pertubuhan Bangsa 
Bersstu (PBB) maintain a semblance of openness, yet their core members 
are constituted from either one of the core groups: the Chinese for 
Gerakan or a combination of two major racial groups: Murut and 
Kadazandusun for UPKO; and Malay, and Melanau and Iban for PBB. 
, T I herefore, racial and political groupings constitute the political order 
within which powel- is distributed. 
A wealth of experieilce has accumulated during the inore than four 
decades of coalition ainong the BN components. The prime minister, 
bring the president of U M N O  and the chairman of the BN, had practised 
what he perceived as the right formula in managing a large multi-ethnic 
coalition. Some commentators have likened the method practised by 
Dr  Mahathir as putting the Chinese "in a box" while others are happy 
with Dr Mahathir's policy of liberal and free enterprise in business and 
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the policy of multi-ethnicity and religious freed~m. '~ The first prime 
minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had been described as being a "pluralist" 
and "inclusivist" in his attitude towards nation-building. By the time 
Tun Razalc took over, the experience of racial tension and conflict had 
influenced hiin to pursue Malay dominance and equitable distribution 
of economic resources. This was followed by a strong conservatism and 
resistance to change during the administration of Tun Hussain Onn.26 
In the case of Abdullah, there is a considerable deliberateness to be 
more inclusivist and to perpetuate the liberal attitude of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman and Dr Mahathir. In a speech as chairman of the BN given at  
the 58th MIC general assembly in Shah Alam, Selangor, on 21 August 
2004, he reminded the assembly that he is a Muslim prime minister of all 
Malaysians who is intent on preserving the multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
harmoily of the country. He also reiterated his promise to "walk the 
talk" of being inoderate and to put national interests above communal 
interests. His reference to Malay issues frequently followed the Mahathir 
practice of berating the Malays and the Bumiputera community for 
their failures in developnlent and harbouring a subsidy mentality, even 
equating them, like other Malaysians, with a "third world mentality 
within a first world infrastructure". 
On  closer examination, a great deal of his proposals so far are a 
continuation of earlier policies which have not been fully realised or 
practised by the government within the entire political process. This 
is notwithstanding certain practices that have become almost a sacred 
convention and customary rule among members. These include the 
formula for sent distribution and the right of the prime minister to 
finalise the candidates for each election. 
The forinula of seat distributioil among RN compoilents inevitably 
reflects the conventional wisdom of the primacy of UMNO within the 
BN which, in turn, is a reflection of the physical delineation of electoral 
cons titumcies. Cri ticisin of gerrymandering in favour of BN and perhaps 
against the Opposition does not necessarily mean it is an undemocratic 
practice since ruling and opposition parties alike would resort to it when 
they are in power. Objectively viewed, it is already a political strategy of 
many ruling groups in democratic states to perpetuate hegemony and 
power. Under such circumstances, UMNO has found it convenient to 
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redistribute power bases within the electorates to its constituencies and 
compoilent members. Abdullah himself has apparently left it to the 
Election Cominission to administer the delineation of constituencies 
and ensure its transparency within the democratic system. 
The last election illustrates the BN wisdom of power-sharing which 
retains its primacy in political terms. With the enlarged parliament 
and state constituencies to 219 and 505 respectively, the advantage 
traditionally practised by UMNO over others does not show a marked 
difference. From 1950 till 2004, the delineation of constituencies 
remained on a rural-weighted basis and has almost fixed its delineation 
advantage of around 12 per cent for Malay-majority constituencies since 
1974. While it is true that malapportionment and gerrymandering, 
apart from natural population increase, could have caused the eventual 
electoral advantage however, as already fully demonstrated by the 1999 
election, it never guarantees electoral success. The fact that there has 
always been a Malay opposition party for the last 50 years inspite of 
its failure to get mass recognition, the constituency advantage merely 
provides an illusioil of superiority which could swing to the Opposition 
given the right strategy and coilditions on their part. 
The other point which must be considered here is the racial basis 
of the Malaysian ruling groups, Malay being the dominant group. 
This concept of racial retention and maintenance of the political order 
has proved to be of great significance to all Malaysians in view of the 
worldwide process of "retribalisation" by post-colonial states. Be it 
in Africa, South Asia, Oceania, the Balkan states, and Central Asia, 
decolonisation has broken many states into racial chaos, civil war, endless 
inter-state rivalries, and even wars. Centuries of subjugation did not 
obliterate racial identities and pride. The "great narratives" of the cold 
war years in the form of deinocratic states, socialism, or communism 
have only given impetus to their emergence after their liberation in 
recent decades, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. The idea 
of the unity of citizens through class integration or solidarity never 
provided the real answer to colonially-engineered territorial union. A 
nation-state is also never the final answer to such colonial legacy. In most 
cases, unity and integration are always engendered through some form 
of racial dominance and ~olitical supremacy of a group. Therefore, to 
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demand iilstitutional changes to racialised political groups, changes to 
the entire foundatioil of the state and mind that maintained it and its 
legal basis have to be made. 
It is true that in recent years there has been a greater awareness of 
the possibility of the non-race-based alternative as demonstrated by 
the failed attempt of the MCA-Gerakan merger or the call for a single 
Dusunkadazan political group. However, the possibility of a race- 
based framework to rework itself into a more flexible structure has also 
been tried and accepted by its members. This possibility has been the 
experiment of U M N O  vis-ii-vis its non-Malay, non-Muslim members 
among the Siam- and Portuguese-descended groups in the north of the 
Peninsula and among all the Bumiputeras of Sabah. The fact that PAS 
was willing to accept to non-Muslim members can be interpreted as 
equating Islam with ethnic-Malays and others as non-Malays. Needless 
to say, if history is of any guide to the Malay mind thus far, the denial 
of the party's ethnic label and consciousness by any UMNO or, for that 
matter, Malay leader, be it Dato' Onn, l'engku Razaleigh (for working 
with the DAP), Tunku Abdd Rahman (in terms of language), and several 
others, has met with disapproval and total rejection through the various 
electoral contests. PAS has attempted to displace this ethnic loyalty with 
an Islamic call and yet its success in 1999 was more or less on the wave 
of other dissatisfactions rather than its Islamic appeal. 
The RN political consensus has served the nation well and therefore 
Abdullah, as the current chairman, has always reminded BN members 
to stick to the rules of the game by being sensitive to the interests of 
others. Table 7.1 shows the number of seats contested and won by each 
cornpoilent party through its participation as a group in parliament after 
the 2004 election. 
The distribution figures indicate that UMNO controls just over 
half (53.4 per cent) of the total number of seats contested and won 93.1 
per cent of its allocation and the rest controls 46.6 per cent of the seats 
and won 87.3 per cent (MCA won 77.5 per cent; NIIC 100 per cent, 
Gerakan 83.3 per cent, and others 100 per cent; SUPP and LDP small 
lost). Obviously, UMNO alone cannot have a dominating position 
with an almost equal number of allocation of seats as the rest. Even 
more glaring is its shaky position of forcing its will on others when its 
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Note: PAS won five out of 84 seats; DAP won ten out of 
44 seats. 
dominance is in fact illusory when viewed within a democratic process of 
decision-making. In a couilcil of coalitioil members, U M N O  can never 
carry any decision without a consensus from its members. Under such a 
circumstance, UMNO has to play its game very cautiously, principally 
using a consultative and circumspect bargaining method to reach a 
common decision. This formula has always been the approach within 
the BN. It is not clear how such a compromise might have been achieved 
among component parties but what has transpired from numerous 
meetings is that the prime minister would make the final decision on 
certain issues related to any particular ethnic groups after an open debate 
and information-sharing. 
Abdulllth has revealed that, "All have the right to speak, even if 
the issue involves matters related to specific races or specific religions. 
I n  the BN style, we are always confident that we can discuss all issues, 
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even if they involved sensitive topics, in a wise manner and come to a 
consensus. The key to this is that we must engage in discussion in an 
attitude of m ~ d e r a t i o n . " ~ ~  
Presumably, the traditional BN-UMNO coalition has continued with 
the understanding that each and every political party in this coalition will 
represent the interest of their racial group within the government. Abdullah 
does not seem to have made any radical changes to the nature of the 
relationship or the process of decision-making. U M N O  seems to continue 
to play the dominant role as the major shareholder of power representing 
Malay interests, while other interests have been similarly considered 
within the limits of the broader perspective. The recent enlargement in 
the number of parliainei~tary seats and state legislative assemblies have 
been allocated to all parties within the confines of the general principle 
and the outcome generally has been accepted by all concerned. 
Internal Dynamics of Political Parties 
The basic convention governing relationships and power-sharing does 
not allow the leaders of component parties to intrude into the affairs of 
others. The internal affairs of a party are the prerogative of the party's 
leadership and perhaps their supreme councils. The style and pattern 
of administration is always left to the decision of the particular party. 
Friendly advice may be given at times to resolve internal disputes and 
dissatisfaction among meinbel-s of another party. The prime minister, as 
chairman of the BN council, occasionally suggests solutions to certain 
on-going disputes which may otherwise lead to problems that would 
weaken a component party and eventually affect the overall BN standing. 
This has frequently occurred within the MCA, PBDS, and several other 
parties. At least for now, Abdullah has left the internal affairs of each 
component party to their respective governing leadership with little 
direct intervention. He  had occasionally urged parties with internal 
problems, such as the PBDS, MCA, and MIC, to manage their internal 
affairs without jeopardising BN interests. Recent attempts by the MCA 
and the Gerakan to merge into a single Chinese party has not drawn 
any public remarks from the prime ministel; nor has he commented on 
the attempt by another Indian political party to join the BN only after 
consultation with the BN's existing partner, the MIC. A recent case of a 
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party split by the PBDS in Sarawak drew some reinarks from the prime 
minister urging the party members to settle their internal affairs without 
jeopardising BN interests. The case seems to illustrate his preference for 
the law to take its own course when the failure to compromise between 
competing factions lead to their deregistration. Similarly, the practice 
of rotating the post of chief minister in Sabah has been discontinued 
after receiving the general consent of the component parties in Sabah. 
Abdullah is presumably happy with the traditional arrangement of 
pursuing common interests through positive engagement and consensus 
cc building. The genernl aim of his government is, to quote him, . . . to 
bring government hack to the people. Government serves the people 
and its policies must empower the people with opportunities, rights 
and responsibilities."'" 
The more significant internal dynamics would be the role and 
funcction of specific units and factions in a political party. For most of 
the RN component members, there is a women's wing, a youth wing, 
and a supreme council which also have to play the power game. In recent 
months, there have been talks of forming a young women's wing in line 
with the Puteri UMNO wing which has demonstrated the efficacy of 
such an addition to attract younger professionals and sustain the party's 
attractiveness to the masses. 
However, it seeins that not everyone among the more established 
leadership welcomes the formation of such a wing. Wanita (Women) 
UMNO expressed initial dissatisfaction with the introduction of Puteri 
UMNO. Apparently it attracted unintended challenges to the positions 
of the incumbent women leaders and thus presents a threat as well as 
a probable inanipulation on the part of the top leadership towards the 
more vocal and established women's wing. 
Apart from such a consideration, the youth wing always demons- 
trated a more vocal demand for the leadership to implement policies 
and achieve stated short-term or long-term goals. There have been 
fiery demands made on certain issues such as that of meritocracy in 
educational placement, eradication of poverty irrespective of race, and 
equal opportunity in education which in some cases would draw similar 
denlailds from conlponent ~ o u t h  wings. It is a working relationship 
among member parties that norinally invites the prime minister as 
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chairman of the BN to officiate annual assemblies and thus allow him 
to rebut criticisms or uphold certain policy issues while reminding 
them of the government's position on the issues at hand. In any case, 
these annual asseinblies play a significant role in addressing public 
party interests and concerns which normally result in some form of 
resolution adopted for further action. Resolutions would normally 
be based on overall national interests and unity. Potential and latent 
conflicts may also be resolved internally among leaders of component 
parties and through meetings of the national councils of the lower-level 
personnel of the woineilj and youth wings of all component members. 
Therefore, in terms of maintaining cohesion and preserving unity, the 
BN has evolved a system of inter-group consultation whenever an issue 
of national interest crops up which urgently needs the establishment 
of a common understanding. It is perhaps within this kind of inter- 
group and interpersonal coilsultations that a great deal of fallouts have 
occurred within each component member whenever a challenge or deep 
dissatisfaction surfaces among the top leadership of the coalition. Many 
UMNO, MCA, MIC, Gerakan, PBDS, PBB, and other promising party 
leaders have been dropped or withdrawn from active participation when 
component members take action against them and publicly declare their 
differences. 
The interest is, therefore, in maintaining the general racial balance 
and equilibriuin within a functionally-harmonious political order. 
The balance is presumably achieved by way of empowering each racial 
group to express their ethnic identities openly and equitably without 
perceptible sense of deprivation vis-2-vis each other. This can only 
be achieved by fully understandillg the needs and concerns of each 
racial group in relation to their common stake in the countiy. For this 
purpose, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that what the government 
is aiming for is to create multi-level identities within the Malaysian 
population whereby, at the lowest intimate level, they would be able to 
identify themselves as the famiily of a certain racial group with political 
representation to ensure that their voice is heard. At the higher level of 
inter-racial interactions, individual identities are reflected in the mass 
admixture of national celebrations of racial particularities such the 
Chinese New Year, Hari Raya, Christmas, Deepavali, harvest festivals, 
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and the creation of opportunities for inter-racial interaction such as the 
custom of "open house". 
At the highest level of international representation, the identity 
would be national which is generally based on so-called national cultural 
principles, i.e, based on the illdigellous representation. This is observable 
on many occasions when ilational sports teams, diplomatic officers, or 
attendees at royal ceremonies would be dressed in the national costume. 
Needless to say, this can be considered as minimal demands made on 
various racial groups whose culture is practised daily and who are not 
forced to adorn a national identity. The preservation of a complex myriad 
of identities presents a culture of choice among Malaysians which will 
remain so in the future. The racial social order with minimum demands 
for identity change seems to be the Malaysian choice for harmonious 
living over and above the class coilsciousness mode. Class does cut across 
racial lines without injuring their unique consciousness as particular 
group identities. 
The Culture of Complex Identities 
Finally, I would add that the political arrangement within the BN 
and the inter-racial composition of the coalition has always been 
determined by the recognition of the principle of indigene and historical 
location of indigenous groups. This, of course, has been met with 
tacit approval and sensitively preserved. It is a fundamental principle, 
the questioning of which will always create waves and severe reaction 
among U M N O  members and the Malays in general. The experience 
during the last four decades of government, first by the Alliance and 
later by the BN, indicated that this fundamental issue is not negotiable 
and is regarded as a sacrosanct foundation stone of the constitutional 
social contract among the various races of the country. The points of 
contention eventually were embodied in the Sedition Act which makes 
anyone liable to be charged in court for tendentious statements made in 
public. The latest controversy that emerged during and after the 1999 
election illustrate the kind of uproar that can happen when a group 
of Chinese associations made the election appeal to political parties, 
known as Suqui, which among other things demanded changes in the 
constitutional order by eliininating the racial categorisation of citizens, 
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away from Bumiputera and non-Rumiputera or Malay and non-Malay. 
The stern reaction caught the sponsor by surprise and, for a while, led 
to strained relations among the Chinese associations and gave rise to 
acrimonious allegations of disrespect for the "racial bargain" as embodied 
in the Constitution. 
From the Malay point of view, the contract has always been the 
ruison d'etre, the reason for existence, of the social order. Therefore, it 
carries a certain degree of obligation on the part of every racial group of 
citizens to respect the provisions and common agreement of the country's 
founding fathers. Since it has some degree of legal and constitutional 
standing, it would, therefore, have certain implications on the political, 
economic, cultural, and social dimensions of life. Translated into policies 
and actions, it would mean that UMNO and the Malays and other 
indigenes would have a slight primacy over others. 
In reality, the translation of such provisions has always depended on 
the perception, personality, and style of leadership of the top political 
leaders, particularly the prime minister. He sets the tone and stamps 
his style on the nature of the relationship among component members 
and the population at large. Generally, his leadership style has seeped 
down to the masses of party members, among leaders at every level, 
and in inter-group relationships. This aura or feeling that such a style is 
working among the populace puts the top leader in a position of power 
and authority. 
The first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, has always been 
cited as the founder of an open and "inclusivist" culture within the 
coalition and the masses through tolerance or a toluk ansur attitude. 
To inany UMNO leaders, he was too "altruistic" with a very high 
threshold for tolerance of the demands of others. Cynics regarded 
this behaviour as being tolak (push), and as a result, the Malays have 
to ansur (shift) to give way to others. Nonetheless, during the last 40 
years, the practice of bargaining or consultation has become a kind of 
funda~nental and sacred principle among the BN coalition members. 
Perhaps the ideal racial objectives each party has attempted to achieve is 
tempered by the "real-politik" of other demands interacting with each 
other. In the end, there must be a sort of common decision and practical 
consensus, which inay occasionally be a bitter   ill to swallow for some 
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leaders, acceptable to all racial groups. A kind of shift and change of 
personal paradigms has to occur in order to accommodate conflicts 
and expectations. Tun Razak, Tun Hussain Onn, and Tun Dr Mahathir 
as well as the subsequent prime ministers have shifted their personal 
stances in the face of strong opposition and debunking by others inspite 
of conveiltioilal and fuildame~ltal norms. In recent years, UMNO has 
seen several shifts in fundamental policies such as the opening up of 
MARA College to non-Malays, the practice of meritocracy in the face of 
rural disadvantage to many Buiniputera groups, the amendment to the 
Industrial coordination Act to allow foreign ownership, and the latest 
being the teaching of science in English in schools which is now facing 
of ~ a l a ~  opposition. In the final analysis, the demands of circumstances, 
be it politics, economics, or race, made its way into what has always been 
defined as pragmatic decisions. 
under-~bdullah,  the socio-political order seems to have under- 
gone a more flexible and, again, pragmatic evolution by stressing 
"Malaysianness" rather than "Malayness" or "Islami~ness'~. The way 
foiward for hiin is one of greater dialogue and consensus-building and the 
construction of a coininoil vision among UMNO and RN members and 
V 
even with the Opposition. He has allowed open and wider consultation 
as well as a greater respect for other views be it legal (parliamentary 
select committee on criminal laws), social (public discussions on road 
safety), economic (the role of GLCs), or political (UMNO's disciplinary 
committee, parliamentary public account committee [PAC] with the 
inclusion of Oppositio~l members). Perhaps the key to his style and 
confidence may be found within the traditional Islamic political thought 
of siyyasah syariah with its emphasis on Tura (consultation) and maslahah 
(public !good) and the belief in the civilising force of Islam under the 
hlnm Hudhari concept. 
There has been no declaration of intent with regards the future 
political culture of "multiculturalism'', but from what has been seen 
so far and the recogllition accorded to the liberalisation of cultural 
practices, especially in the realms of religion and the economy, there is 
greater hope for a more Malaysian approach and a solution to national 
problems than is presently understood. This is good for the preservation 
of conlplex identities and pluralistic policies in Malaysia. Perhaps Ye 
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Lin-Sheng's optimism for Malaysia is well founded when he recounted 
his encounter with Malayness: 
"Wlien I first read The Mulay Dilerrlrrln it was easy for me to identie with the 
poverty and humiliation of the Mdays and the explosive feelings mentioned by 
Mahathir. I have always thought that if there was a race that could understand 
Tk~e Malay Dilemma it would have been us the Chii~ese."'~ 
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